> There were not _witness statements_ presented by the defense in support of myriad facts, but it's not like the case for the defense wasn't made at all.
It kind of wasn't. In UK civil cases your witness statement takes the place of your testimony on the stand (only cross exam is done on the stand). Outside of your witness statement(s) the other material in your case (e.g. random pleadings and inter-parties correspondence) aren't made under the same penalties for perjury.
So if you're going to tell a bunch of lies in your case (ill advised, for sure) then you're best off to do it via all other means and avoid ever producing a witness statement.
But as a result it's also important for the judge to generally discard such positions when not supported by material attested to in a way with serious consequences.
The roombas with cameras don't need an internet connection to work-- they need it if you want the app control features like scheduling. The imagery based navigation is still local.
When I got one in ~2019, I covered the camera and connected it long enough for it to get firmware updates (which annoyingly you can't trigger and it takes a few days)... then I firewalled it off to get no internet access.
I later figured out that if you let it connect and firewall it off it just sits in a tight loop trying to connect again hundreds of times per second which meaningfully depletes the battery faster.
Changing the SSID name so it couldn't connect to the wifi solved the problem.
I'd like to get a new one-- the old one still runs well (with some maintenance, of course) but the latest robot vacuums are obviously better. Unfortunately at least some are more cloud dependent and I can't tell which are and to what degree.
Yes, that's deliberately missing the point of what was said though. We know the vacuum is using the camera (when equipped) while the unit is running. Go back and re-read what I wrote to see why this is not the same thing.
The article discusses it photographing people exposed on the toilet, and employees sharing the images for lulz. I think that does refute your position that people wouldn't be in compromising positions in front of their vacuum.
Microsoft research had some good publications on generating infinite non-repeating textures by (IIRC) markov-filling an aperiodic tile set, including creating video textures. I tried to find the examples a few months ago but the old URLs I'd bookmarked were no longer working.
> no way to prevent the intentional weaponisation of chat/ai
AI psychosis is happening without any intentional weaponization. Sure you can't help intentional bad outcomes but accidental ones are much worse because they don't require a malicious party.
Consider a conman-- a harm to society for sure, but he can only con so many people and he'll only do so in ways that get him money, power, glory, etc. Bad sycophantic AI can con and unlimited number of people and isn't limited to destorying their lives in ways that benefit the AI's owners.
> Also, the privacy and the finding are in direct opposition to each-other, which isn’t always a comfortable system dynamic. ... or some sort of group key sharing
Perhaps you might consider a pinsketch in the manner proposed for cryptographic biometric security. https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0602007
With it two peers could compare their BSSID environments and learn ~nothing about each other unless they were nearly matching.
I can see how one could use it for location based key agreement for mutual authentication-- not as obvious to me how to apply it to privacy preserving location.
The latter would probably just best be accomplished by downloading the whole database, or (less optimally) using PIR to probe for the locations of single BSSIDs.
Ideally nodes have lots of connections so that attackers can't so easy block transaction and block propagation and censor information. But lots of connections means lots of network bandwidth wasted relaying redundant information nodes already know about.
From day one bitcoin relayed transactions by offering just their hashes and only requesting what wasn't known. But even sending hashes ends up being a lot of data in total, and the bandwidth scales with peers*transactions. Using set reconciliation changes that to more like peers+transactions.
When using setrecon for authentication its important that the scheme is as close to information theoretically optimal as possible-- which makes approaches like pinsketch important.
For the transaction case faster but less communications efficient methods might be better except that latency is also a consideration for Bitcoin and minimizing latency means running reconciliation often. This stresses the inefficiencies of alternative tools as well as covers up for the quadratic decode cost of pinsketch.
I'm not aware of anyone using our minisketch library for authentication-ish uses but I'd be interested in seeing it.
It kind of wasn't. In UK civil cases your witness statement takes the place of your testimony on the stand (only cross exam is done on the stand). Outside of your witness statement(s) the other material in your case (e.g. random pleadings and inter-parties correspondence) aren't made under the same penalties for perjury.
So if you're going to tell a bunch of lies in your case (ill advised, for sure) then you're best off to do it via all other means and avoid ever producing a witness statement.
But as a result it's also important for the judge to generally discard such positions when not supported by material attested to in a way with serious consequences.