PRC built ~550 GW of solar last year, ~300GW domestic, ~250GW export. About 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day in energy flow. Assume 30 year lifespan, everyday OF PRC solar production = ~120 million barrels of oil stock (4mbd * 30 ys) , assume 17% capacity factor = 820Twh/yr using primary energy / equivalent / substitution method of 1 unit of solar = 3 unit of oil @35% work efficiency.
For reference global oil production is ~100 mb/d. Global LNG= ~70 mb/d equivalent. Global coal = ~110 mb/d equivalent. PRC solar effectively brrrintg new emission free oil field every 24 hours that is larger than all global oil producers combined.
PRC solar capacity is like 1100 GW... lots of idle plants, but on paper PRC solar can produce more energy than all global fossil combined. But world (including PRC) can't absorb/plugin/transition that fast. Now consider solar takes PRC like 18 months to build / scale vs 7-10 year lead for oil infra from RoW.
Another point to consider is manufacturing all these panels, which are net carbon sinks, count towards PRC emissions, vs extracting oil/lng where exporters who gets to shift emission accounting onto importers/consumers. IF PRC got credited for ~100 mb/d of fossil displaced via solar (round down for conservative carbon payback), PRC emissions would be completely negated, i.e. PRC solar would avoid like 1.5x-2x more emissions than PRC generates.
Carbonbrief put out a report with a similar theme last July.
They calculated that Chinese green tech exports in 2024 reduced the rest of the world's carbon by 1%.
It's mostly solar (though they calculated EVs and some other stuff too) so assuming 25 years life that would be equivalent to 25% of the world-minus-China's CO2 emissions or about 18%.
So Chinese exports in one year cancel out 2/3rds of their yearly CO2.
Emphasis on "so", i.e. past obvious strategic rationale like food "security", there's reason to believe US ag has excessive subsidies. IMO answer is like every other "strategic" sector, farmland political economy has been captured by wealth (i.e. Bill Gates largest farmland owner). There's a fuckload of tax haven / loop holes tied to farmland that defers capital gains tax, estate/inheritance tax, property tax. Farmland is stable investment (because land) used to park wealth - it's an asset class, hence if held as asset, wealthy will double down / double dip to make sure it doesn't go idle, so they lobby all the "easy" crops to get massive subsidies and now something like 80% of subsidies goes to top 10% of recipients. US doesn't need to produce that much surplus corn/soy, but it's relatively easy to grow so big agri with capital sunk on those crops will lobby for continued subsidy of said crops, build up even more wasteful sectors like agri to energy (30-50% of corn goes to ethanol), and next thing you know a very inefficient ground water to subsidized agri commodity to gdp generator takes on it's own logic. TLDR, people good at at spread sheets rigged US agri like they rigged everything else.
There's no contradiction to resolve, Trump decided CAN should no longer benefit from proximity. That's the geopolitical reality under current US admin. There's nothing left to do but hedge and move on or wait for new US admin. Ontario auto is 2.5% of gdp, Alberta crude is 5.5%, other exports to US is 9%... i.e. 17% of CAN gdp. CAN US imports is 16% of GDP - it's reasonably balanced, and TBH US got better deal since that 5.5% crude is massive discount, CAN could be selling it for more if US meddling didn't prevent CAN from refining for decades. But broadly those are Canadian exposure. Really all CAN can do if US doesn't to trade without retarded geopolitical conditions is to hedge by diverting 17% export to other buyers and minimize the 16% imports from US (ideally circular Canadian substitution between provinces). Really if US/Trump throws hissy fit over reasonable economic rebalancing (not strategic shift, CAN not replacing NORAD with PLARF) with most of worlds' largest trade partner, then not much Canada can do but wait for next annexation attempt.
He said legacy / naive multinational orgs where hegemons with disproportionate influence and exceptionalism can game the system to subordinate smaller countries, especially in stacked bilaterals. He propose variable geometry which is scoping down from "universal" multinational orgs to "exclusive" minilaterals of medium sized countries come together to hedge on issues against hegemons to avoid being on the menu. It's not a contradiction, it's proposing we move from rule based, to power based, i.e. like-minded medium countries need to bandwagon to leverage as bloc, which means entails being exclusive / eliminate weak links / prevent capture. It maybe wishcasting but it's a different arrangement than legacy system.
RMB settled ~60% of PRC cross border payments last year (up from 30% a few years ago), ~6T USD equivalent in settlement, which already makes rmb more real/useful currency than euro/yen reserves. And functionally shadow reserve - RMB can buy Chinese inputs, intermediate goods and global commodities, i.e. even oil delinked from USD, which covers like everything a country typically needs. That's what reserve is ultimately for, to buy shit/liquidity, not mere storage. RMB already guarantees access to most global goods for the simple reason PRC is producer of said goods. PRC also has massive USD war chest reserves, they already do USD lending AND USD swaplines to global south. In terms of liquidity/scale of swapline to EU, peak US swapline to EU was like 600B during covid and 2008 financial crisis, i.e. 20% of PRC USD reserves, which PRC increasingly need to find uses for as she displaces more USD from trade settlement. So it's doable for PRC, but question of trust, but not whether EU trust PRC, but whether PRC trust EU since these swap lines tend to be commodity-backed, where frankly EU has limited offerings to PRC.
Well the real question: Is the US losing interest in reserve dominance?
Contrary to popular opinion, IMO PRC doesn't want reserve currency trade off (triffin / trade deficits etc). What PRC wants is to secure her own interests with RMB, which is mostly happening, energy contracts, lots of bilateral trade happening in RMB now. What PRC also wants is to make maintaining reserve USD onerous, i.e. high rates, high debt servicing... which already indirectly limits US in real ways like reduced defense acquisitions in last few years.
PRC wants USD exorbitant privilege to be just exorbitant.
Then US incentivized to dump system (etc debasing) which will fuck over global USD users and tank US reputation even more. A lot of US actions make sense when you realize Trump doesn't want to deal with an increasingly unprofitable global utility. PRC doesn't want to step in to build new pipelines, they want to see US (mis)manage existing US owned plumbing that everyone is using so poorly it fucks up things at home and for everyone else, meanwhile PRC has comfy off the grid setup for herself and her guests.
Arizona fabs don't work without TW's many sole source suppliers for fab consumables. They'll likely grind to halt after few months when stock runs out. All the dollar shuffling's not going to replace supply chain that will take (generously) years to build, if ever.
US buyers owns like 10x more real estate in Canada in $$$ terms than PRC buyers, and US tends to buy the strategic stuff like commercial/industry, something like 50% of all foreign controlled assets in Canada is controlled by US. VS PRC mostly buying houses, foreigners own like 5% of housing stock in Canada.
>what are they going to buy annually that will make a difference at this point
Mechanically, "they" being sovereign banks serve as price-insensitive marginal buyers that close treasury auctions regardless of price because they buy treasury for storage/liquidity. VS domestic buyers (hedgefund insurance), who are price sensitive = raise rates to attract discriminate buyers who buy for yield/valuation = worse debt servicing = faster debasing. Foreign sovereign buyers still play governor role in making sure domestic buyers get a shit none-market deal, i.e. US gov gets a good deal which moderates velocity of debasing. Of course past certain level of debt brrrting, the ability for sovereign buyers to absorb is compromised, in which case it makes sense for US to fuck foreign buyers over and inflate away as much debt as possible while still reserve currency - US can inflate/soft default faster than world can unwind. And TBH US will probably be "fine" as long as US can still gunboat diplomacy. If can't be banker anymore, be the mob boss.
For reference global oil production is ~100 mb/d. Global LNG= ~70 mb/d equivalent. Global coal = ~110 mb/d equivalent. PRC solar effectively brrrintg new emission free oil field every 24 hours that is larger than all global oil producers combined.
PRC solar capacity is like 1100 GW... lots of idle plants, but on paper PRC solar can produce more energy than all global fossil combined. But world (including PRC) can't absorb/plugin/transition that fast. Now consider solar takes PRC like 18 months to build / scale vs 7-10 year lead for oil infra from RoW.
Another point to consider is manufacturing all these panels, which are net carbon sinks, count towards PRC emissions, vs extracting oil/lng where exporters who gets to shift emission accounting onto importers/consumers. IF PRC got credited for ~100 mb/d of fossil displaced via solar (round down for conservative carbon payback), PRC emissions would be completely negated, i.e. PRC solar would avoid like 1.5x-2x more emissions than PRC generates.
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