(And if you read the linked post, … like this value function is established on a whim, with far less thought than some of the value-functions-run-amok in scifi…)
The emoji search box's search bar sometimes will just stop working, usually after a {input, erase input, new input} sequence. No idea why. Dismiss picker, try again.
Sometimes the picker just refuses to be summoned.
Bluetooth is a mess. File transfers will fail, who knows why? Certainly not macOS. Often I'll just punt to GoogleDrive-TP.
Really random screen wakes.
Left macOS alone for 5s? All your windows have decided to start playing a game of musical desktop, and need 10s to re-arrange themselves back into place, also while sometimes displaying their contents at 2x.
Slack has any number of these; e.g., emoji inside codeblocks are simply corrupted. A number of odd corner cases in URLs will corrupt, and each edit of the message will further corrupt it.
So much of the web is plagued by some framework that, upon any JS exception, will destroy the entire DOM (idk maybe defunct page > no page at all?) and leave you only with "ApplicationError: …".
At this point I'd add "is a motorcycle a car? Is a pedestrian signal a stop light?!" CAPTCHAKCAS to this list, but those are a "feature".
If we're doing "features": password fields with no option to view the plaintext value? I use long passwords, and if I'm in a safe place, I would much rather see what I'm typing and correct any typos I make along the way than have to retype the same password multiple times with long delays between each attempt.
Also, once a day my Touch ID stops working and I need to log in with my password again. That's fine, the passwordless access expires after 24 hours or so, fair enough. But I turn my laptop on fresh every morning and have to also put my password in then. If I do that, I at least expect to be and to use my fingerprint until the end of the day.
The wombo combo is field that doesn't allow pasting (???) plus app that forgets where you are. So you can't paste, so you type the first few characters, dismiss the app to look at what the field should be, come back and boom - it's cleared out or, worse, you're on the home page. For some reason banks LOVE this.
Why can't I disable MacOS "start every app I can think of" when you restart the laptop?
No, I don't want to launch Word, Excel, Sheets, and System Monitor when I reboot. They weren't even running when I restarted, and I unticked the launch apps on restart. Every. Damn. Time.
In the shutdown / restart confirmation dialog there’s a checkbox to reopen apps at login. If there’s a bug with it I haven’t noticed it.
You can also run
I do untick it. It's a bug that happens with every restart.
I'll have a go with setting the defaults, I'm wondering if there was a file it writes out open applications to (to trigger on restart) that has somehow become corrupted and therefore doesn't get cleared.
Do you know where MacOS stores the list to reopen?
As a backend engineer, I am beyond tired of frontend engineers taking what is a Javascript programming error ("[Uncaught DOMException:] The operation is insecure" is a JS exception. It is most commonly raised when a page wants access to APIs without permission to such) and blaming it on the backend ("500 Internal Server Error" — except this is just a lie. No 500s occurred).
> By the way, a state ID costs […] $9 for “eligible people” in California.
A state ID is not required to register to vote in CA[1]. (The requirement is CA ID number or last-four-of-SSN or a third complicated way, but I'm assuming ID or SSN is attainable for nigh everyone eligible.)
If we interpret "blockchain" "visibto to anyone" "transparent blockchain" charitably, TFA addresses your proposal pretty directly. (a.) Your design is likely not receipt-free — it is thus susceptible to coercion & bribery. (b.) How does your blockchain based proposal allow the voter to achieve confidence that extraneous votes are not being cast?
> because these votes will be counted electronically at some point, either by a machine
Random sampling (selecting a random subset of ballots, and manually counting them, and comparing against a machine total) is a cheap way to defend against this. But also, paper ballots mean that a full recount can be done, at which point any malfeasance becomes visible. It is likely that an attacker is going to want their tracks to not be so easily discoverable, so the mere possibility of such itself is a deterrent.
> or just a simple Excel sheet,
They needn't be, and results can be reported to various news agencies, interested observers, representatives of candidates or parties, etc. What is the likelihood of everyone's Excel sheet being compromised?
> The voting process should be designed in a way with zero trust in mind,
A paper process is explainable to a normal adult of reasonable intelligence, to a degree such that trust & confidence in the paper balloting process should be establishable. Most online voting systems cannot say that. Even I as a SWE would not be able to convince myself of most electronic systems, let alone an Internet based system. Is the source even available? (This is not a given.) Is the source correct? (Underhanded code is a thing, and it is unlikely that I, myself, can audit the entire thing.) Is the binary produced actually from the same source? Can the hardware used be trusted? (You literally cannot see transistors, and even if you could, you cannot verify their function!)
Blockchain systems and similar relieve some of this pressure — but not all of it. E.g., I would still have a hard time explaining the math involved to 99% of the population beyond "trust me, it works" — and the point is that that answer is unacceptable as a requirement of the problem.
> Not requiring a proof with a photo of the person and a proof that he's legally in the US should not be allowed in public elections.
This is essentially (esp. once combined with the rest of your comment) misinformation: fraudulent voting by non-citizens effectively doesn't occur[1]. To sum it up,
> A Brennan Center for Justice study of 2016 data from 42 jurisdictions found an estimated 30 incidents of suspected noncitizen voting out of 23.5 million votes cast (or .0001% of votes).
I.e., a rounding error.
> How comes the democrats try to block every single voter ID act? Sounds to me there's something to hide.
Generally, the counter argument is that further requirements stifle voters, while not solving any real problem, since the above concern is not backed by actual facts demonstrating it to be a valid concern.
> There has also been some very shady counting happening in 2020: where during the last hours suddenly 100% of the votes coming in in some states where all for Biden.
You're assuming the vote is uniform, and it's pretty trivial to show it's not; look at any vote-by-county map, and you'll see urban centers are far more Democrat heavy. Expecting the tallying to then be uniform is illogical.
> Note that Trump, […], said
His words are beyond bereft of trust[2].
> I'd add that, in my opinion, bringing in millions of illegals then trying to regularize them and allow them to vote is also a form of election rigging, even if it's legal.
[citation needed], but this isn't a thing. No jurisdiction I know of permits non-naturalized immigrants, legal or otherwise, to register to vote. If they've been naturalized, voting is their right, same as it is mine.
Receipt-freeness (i.e., a secret ballot) is usually the desired property. Yes, a lot of people like you state they desire verifiable votes. But that's where you need to respond to the points the person above you is making: how is such a system not also susceptible to coercion and bribery?
(However you would verify your vote, imagine the person who is coercing you is just standing over your shoulder with threat of force. An example might be an abusive husband who does not want to allow their wife to vote freely/against him. A briber might simply force you to allow them to look over your shoulder before they'll pay you off.)
Vs. paper ballots in a polling place: a coercer would not be permitted in the poll booth with me. I get to vote, and when I leave, … I can tell them whatever, but it does not need to match my vote. It utterly defeats bribery, as the briber has no way to verify that I'm doing what they way.
At least in the US, I think there are a number of suggestions that are made repeatedly each cycle here. Like "it should be a paid federal holiday", and not putting onerous requirements on voters. Automatic registration. The list goes on.
But I what is written over and over is more on the lines of "I don't trust the process". I cannot blame anyone for not trusting Internet voting: I am a professional SWE, and it would be impossible for me to establish that any such system isn't pwned. Too much code to audit, hardware that's impossible to audit. But it's pretty trivial to demonstrate to the layperson how paper voting works, and how poll observers can prevent that process from being subverted.
Some paper jurisdictions have this, essentially. E.g., where I live: the ballot is a paper ballot. You vote by filling in a circle/bubble. (If you're familiar with a "scantron" … it's that.)
It looks like a paper document intended for a human, and it certainly can be. A machine can also read it. (And does, prior to it being cast: the ballot is deposited into what honestly looks like a trashcan whose lid is a machine. It could presumably keep a tally, though IDK if it does. It does seem to validate the ballot, as it has false-negative rejected me before.)
But now the "paper trail" is exactly what I submit; it's not a copy that I need to verify is actually a copy, what is submitted it my vote, directly.
Can you? Yes, and TFA demonstrates this quite clearly.
Should you?
This is where I'd be more careful. Maybe it makes sense to some of the langs in TFA. But it reminds me of [named]tuples in Python, which are iterable, but when used as tuples, in particular, as heterogeneous arrays¹ to support returning multiple values or a quick and dirty product type (/struct), the ability to iterate is just a problem. Doing so is almost always a bug, because iteration through a such tuple is nigh always nonsensical.
So, can an array also be f(index) -> T? Sure. But does that make sense in enough context, or does it promote more bugs and less clear code is what I'd be thinking hard about before I implemented such a thing.
¹sometimes tuples are used as an immutable homogeneous array, and that case is different; iteration is clearly sane, then
Seconded. The call syntax is priveliged, and overloading it to serve as array indexing is a cute demonstration of how arrays approximate piecewise functions, but the same can be said for every data structure in some capacity.
(And if you read the linked post, … like this value function is established on a whim, with far less thought than some of the value-functions-run-amok in scifi…)
(and if you've never played it: https://www.decisionproblem.com/paperclips/index2.html )
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